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Humans and other animals typically will choose more immediate rewards over delayed rewards of equal magnitude. What iI surprising, at least from certain persp~, is that often they also will choose more immediate rewards over delayed rewards of larger magnitude. Many different accounts of the latter finding hue been offered (e.g., lack of impulse contrOl, poor ego strength, conflict between multiple selves), but the dominant account in the behavioral economic literature relies on the assumption that the value of a future reward decreases with increasing length of time to its receipt (Kagel, Battalio, &: Green, 1995) . This decrease in value as a function of delay iI tenned tlmporal discountiftf. The temporal discounting account posits tha~ a smaller, more immediate reward may be chosen because the present (or subjective) value of the larger, more delayed reward is discounted; hence, its present value may be less than that of the more immediate reward.
From the perspective of temporal discounting, the question of interest becomes the nature of the mathematical relation among amount, delay, and value. Economists and psychologists have typically employed tWo different approaches to determining this func-tion. Economisu have taken a "rational" approach to the problem and have attempted to derive a fonnula from theoretical usumptions, often based on a normative model of what organisms ought to do. In conb"Ut, psychologistS have taken an "empirical" approach and ha\Ie attempted to find the foil. mula that best describes what organisms are observed to do. The present work attempts to bring these tWO approaches together. First, we will present data from individual subjecu for the purpose of evaluating several different fonnulas that have been proposed; second, we will present tWO rational derivations of what our analyses suggest is the best descriptive fonnuIa.
One fonnula that has been proposed to describe the temporal discounting of delayed rewards is bued on the standard discounted utility model in economics (Samuelson, . This model assumes that the value of a future reward is discounted because of the risk involved in waiting for iL Given a contingent relationship between an organism's choice of a delayed reward and its eventUal receipt, it is further assumed that there is a constant hazard rate that this relationship will fail. In a fonging situation, for example, the constant hazard rate might correspond to a constant probability that, in any given unit of time, a predator may prevent the forager from obWning the reward or that another 011. ganism may get the reward firsL If there is a JOEL MYERSON and LEONARD GREEN 264 constant hazard rate associated with waiting, then the fonn of the temporal discounting function will be exponential:
( 1) where V is the present value of a futUre reward, A is its amount, D is the delay to its receipt, and k is a parameter indicating the constant hazard rate.
Another formula that has been proposed has the form of a hyperbolic relation betWeen value and delay (Ainslie, 1992; see also Mazur, 1987; Rachlin, 1989) :
where i is a par2meter governing the rate of decrease in value. Fit to the lame data, the hyperbola will initially (at short delays) decrease faster than the exponential, but will then (at long delays) decrease more slowly than the exponential. The hyperbola has been justified primarily on empirical grounds (Ainslie. 1992; Mazur, 1987; Rachlin, Raineri, 8c Cross, 1991; Rodriguez 8c Logue, 1988) , as has a variation on this fonnula that involves raiaiiag the denominator to a power (Green, Fry, 8c Myenon. 1994; Loewenstein 8c Prelec, 1992) .
The empirical justification for using the by. perbolic model rather than the exponential model has been twofold. Flnt, the hyperbolic model pennitl preference revenals in subjects' choices betWeen a smaller reward obtainable after a brief delay and a larger reward obtainable after a longer delay. That is, although subjects may prefer the smaller to the larger reward, if an equal amount of time is then added to each delay, subjecu may now prefer the larger reward (Green, FISher, Perlow, 8c Sherman, 1981; Green, Fristoe, 8c Myerson, 1994; Navarick., 1982; Rachlin 8c Green, 1972) . Second. the hyperbolic model predicts the slope of an indifference function (Mazur, 1987) that gives the delay to a larger reward as a function of the delay to a m1aller reward of equivalent subjective value. Both exponential and hyperbolic models predict linear relations betWeen the two delays. but only the hyperbolic model predicts that the slope will be greater than 1.0. Studies with both pigeons and humans have confinned this prediction (Green, Fristoe, " Myerson, 1994; Mazur, 1987; Rodriguez 8c Logue. 1988) .
It has ~en argued that an exponential model cannot account for either preference reversals or the slope of indifference functions. However, this argument Ulumes that a given delay has the: same proportional effect on the value: of both small and large:r rewards. That is, following the discounted utility model, the parameter k in the exponential function is assumed to be the same for smaller and larger rewards, and an exponential model incorporating this assumption predicts neither preference reversals nor the slope of indifference functions.
Recently, however, the assumption of amount-independent discounting has been shown to be false. Studies of choice between delayed rewards in humans have demonsuated that larger rewards are discounted less steeply with increasing delay than are smaller rewards (Benzjon, Rapoport, &: Yagil, 1989; Green, Fry, &: Myenon, 1994; Raineri &: Rachlin, 1995; Thaler, 1981) . Moreover, we have Ihown that if the discount parameter k is inlenely related to amount, then both the ex-)onential and hyperbolic models predict )reference reversals (Green &: Myerson, 1995) , and both models aIao predict indiff'ernce functions with slopes greater than 1.0 : Green , Fristoe, &: Myerson, 1994) . Thus, pre-/ious arguments against exponential dis-:ounting are moot, and the correct fonn of he discounting function is still an unresolved SlUe. Rachlin et al. (1991) ha\le shown that a hy»erbola (Equation 2) provides a better fit to :roup data than does an exponential decay Unction (Equation 1). However, it should be ecalled that the fonn of the function decribing aggregate (e.g., group) data is not lecessarlly the same as the fonn of the funcion describing unaggregated (e.g., individu-J) data (EsteS, 1956; Sidman, 1952) . Thereore, the Rachlin et al. finding does not lemonsuatc that the hyperbolic model proides a more accurate description of data rom individual subjects than an exponential !lodel does. In order to compare hyperbolic nd exponential accounts of individual belavior, we: now reanalyze the data from a preious study of human choice behavior Green, Fry, &: Myenon, 1994 ). In addition ) considering simple one-parameter e:xpoe:ntial and hyperbolic models (Equations 1 nd 2), we also examine several slightly more 7EMPORAL DISCOUNTING BY lND1V1DUALS complicated versions of these models. Finally, we provide ration a! derivations for the models that besl describe the individual data.
METHOD St£bjlcts
The present study reanalyzes the data from the 12 college Students whose group median data were reported by Green, Fry, and Myerson (1994) .
Participants were tested indi\riduaJly in a quiet room. Hypothetical amounts of money were printed on sets of cards (4 in. by 6 in.). Two sets of cards were placed on a table in front of the participant. One set indicated the delayed. fixed-amount reward (i.e., $1,000 or $10,000), and the other set indicated the immediate variable amount (i.e., SO values ranging from 0.1% to 100% of the fixed an10unt). Participants were told:
In this experiment, 7Ou will be asked to make a seria of hypothetical decisions between monew-y alternatives. As 7Ou can lee, there are tWO Rtl of cards in front of you. The cards on your left will offer 7Ou an amount of money to be paid right now. This amount will vary from card to card. On the cards on your right, the amount will be either $1,000 or $10,000, but itS payment will be delayed. Please look at the sample cards at this time. It will be 7Our job to point to the card you would prefer. You will be ~ four practice trials before you begin, and the experimenter will b1rn the cards for 7Ou.
Participants were shown two carda at a time and made a series of choices betWeen the fixed-amount reward that could be obtained after a delay (shown on the right card) and an immediately obtainable reward that varied in amount (shown on the left card). For example, the participant had to make a choice betWeen $10,000 in 5 years or $6,000 now. The eight delays at which the $1,000 and $10,000 fixed amounts could be obtained were 1 week, 1 month, 6 months, 1 year, S years, 5 years, 10 years, and 25 years.
Participants were swdied first with one of the tWO values of the fixed. delayed amount paired with immediate reward amounts presented in both ascending and descending order. This procedure was followed with the 265 same fixed amount at each of the eight delays before the other fixed amount was presented. The order of presentation of the fixed (i.e.. $1.000 or $10.000) rewards and the corresponding tiu-ation (i.e., either ascending or descending) of the immediate rewards were counterbalanced. However. the fixed-amount delays were always presented from the shonest delay (1 week) to the longest delay (25 years).
For each fixed amount at each delay, we calculated the average of the immediate amount at which the participant switched preference from the immediate to the delayed reward on the descending titration and the amount at which the participant switched preference from the delayed to the immediate reward on the ascending titration. This average immediate amount, termed the present value of the delayed reward, corresponds to V in Equations 1 and 2. Figure 1 shows temporal discounting functiona (i.e., present value as a function of delay) for group data in the $1,000 and $10,000 delayed-reward conditions. Distributions of the present value of delayed rewarda typically are skewed due to the limits imposed on subjects' choices (i.e., the present value of an amount of money available after a brief delay can never be greater than the amount itself, and the present value of an amount available after a long delay can never be less than zero; Rachlin et aI., 1991), hence the median is the appropriate measure of central tendency. The hyperbola (Equation 2) provides a better fit to the data than an exponential decay function (Equation 1). Note that the exponential overestimates the present value of a delayed reward at briefer delays and underestimates the values at longer delays. Although there is a tendency for the hyperbola to also do this for the $10,000 reward, the error is clearly much smaller. For the $1,000 delayed reward, the proportions of variance accounted for by the hyperbolic and exponential modeJs were .992 and .925, respectively. For $10,000, the corresponding proportions of variance accounted for were .958 and .810.
RESULTS
The present value of the $1.000 delayed rt:-ward decreased more sharply as a function of delay than did the present value of the $10,000 reward. This is reflected in the k. parameten that govern the rates of discounting predicted by both the hyperbolic and exponential models. For the hyperbola (Equation 2), the estimates of the k. parameten were .044 and .018 for the $1,000 and $10,000 rewards, respectively: for the exponential model (Equation 1), the corresponding estimates of the k. parameter were .025 and .011.
These conclusions regarding the form of the temporal discounting function and whether or not its parameters are amount de-JOEL MYERSON and. LEONARD GREDl pendent should be considered provisional because they are based on analyses of group data.. With respect to the issue of the form of the function (e.g., iI the relation exponential or hyperbolic?), it is well known that group functions may not reflect the form of individual functions (e.g., Estes, 1956; Sidman, 19.52) . In addition, the question of whether discounting is steeper for the smaller reward iI also best answered based on analyses of individual data. Even if group functions are similar in form to individual functions, the Type I error rate for decisions regarding parameter estimateS (e.g., does the k for $1,000 differ significantly from the k for $10,OOO?) is inflated when those decisions are based on aggleg&te data from repeated measures designs (Lorch &: Myen, 1990) .
Figures 2 and S show the data from each of the 12 subjects. For ease of comparison, the present value of the delayed reward is expressed as a proportion of its nominal value (i.e., either $1,000 or $10,000). All subjects showed fairly orderly temporal discounting. Moreover, most subjects discounted the value of the smaller reward more steeply, although the opposite was seen in 2 subjects (S4 and 512). In addition, there was a tendency for present value to level oft' without reaching zero in some subjectS (e.g., S3 and 58).
Both exponential and hyperbolic models (Equations 1 and 2) were fit to the data from the individual subjects. Table 1 presentS the values of k and the proportions of variance explained by exponential and hyperbolic di.. counting functions for each subject as well as the median of these k values and the median propordon of explained variance for the $1,000 and $10,000 delayed rewards. Because the distributions of these values are skewed, the median (rather than the mean) is the appropriate measure of central tendency, and nonparameteric testS provide the appropriate basis for statistical inferences. For the $1,000 condition, the median of the es for fits to individual subjects' data was .952 for the hyperbola venus .852 for the exponential decay. When the es obtained with Equations 1 and 2 were compared wing a Wilcoxon matchedpain signed-ranks test, the hyperbolic fits proved to be significantly better, T -8, P < was greater than that for the exponentiaJ decay, .946 versus. 796. Moreover, the hyperbol. ic fits were again significantly better based on a Wilcoxon matched-pain signed-ranks test. T = !, P < .01.
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Inspection of the aggregated data as well a ,data from some individual subjects suggest that the present value of a delayed reward d( creases less sharply at long delays than is pre dicted by either Equation 1 or Equation . The value of k is omitted becaUR the poor fit made the parameter estimate meaningless (lee below). RI of .000 indicateS that the funcdOil accounted for lea of the variance than did the mean.
(for a clear example, see the bottom panel of Figure 1 ). A two-parameter exponential model that may capture this property of the data is given by Equation !;
Rather than decaying to zero as D increases, value approaches an asymptote of s. (In Equation 1 the expression e -kD was multiplied by A, but in Equation! the exponential expression is multiplied by A -s so that, in both cases, when D is zero, V equals A) A two-parameter hyperbola-like model that may also capture the form of the decrease in present value has been proposed (Green, Fry, " Myerson, 1994; Loewenstein" Prelec, 1992) ;
Here, s modifies the form of the hyperbola so that when s is less than 1.0, it flattens the curve causing it to level off as D increases. For the data from the $1,000 condition, the median of the es for fits to individual subjects' data was .979 for Equation 4 and .956 for Equation S. When the es obtained with Equations -' and 4 were compared using a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test, the fits based on Equation 4 proved to be significandy better, T = II, P < .05. For the data from the $10,000 condition, the median of the es for Equation 4 was ~ain greater than that for Equation 3, .976 versus .919. More-269 7EMPORAL DISCOUNTING BY INDIVlDUALS Table 1 over, the fits based on Equation 4 were again significantly better according to a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test, T = 3, P < .01. Thus, regardless of whether one compares Equations 1 and 2 or Equations 3 and 4, a hyperbola-like model describes the temporal discounting by individual subjects better than an exponential model does.\ Up to this point, we have been comparing models with different fonns but of similar complexity (i.e., Equation 1 VI. Equation 2 and Equation S VI. Equation 4). We now compare models of related form that differ in complexity (e.g., models with an amount-independent.
parameter "versw models in which h varies with amount, and models without an exponent venw models with an exponent). How can one decide between simpler and more complicated models? Given that the addition of a free parameter will generally improve the fit of a model to data, simple comparisons of the proportion of van- 6 ). In addition. it may be noted that the term ~c fitndiDn refers to a member of a clua of trigonomea'ic functions, and thus Equation 2 is not a hyperbolic function. However. the term /I)'P""6olic may be used as an adjective in other expressions (as in hyperbolic model and hyperbolic relation. and even hyperbolic discounting function) that reo fer to a hyperbola such as Equation 2.
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ance accounted for (such as those we used to compare models with the same number of free pararneten) will nol suffice. When the question is whether an additional parameter is needed in the sense that a particular parameter takes on different values in different situations (as in the case in which the que$-tion is whether a single A can be used for different amounts of delayed reward), parameter escimates can be treatedjust like any other measure, and standard statistical tests apply (e.g., Lorch Be Myen, 1990). When the que. tion is whether an additional parameter is needed or not (as in the case in which the question is whether the denominator of the hyperbolic model must be raised to a power), one standard approach (e.g., Gallant, 1987) is to test whether estimates of the value of the parameter differ significantly from the value predicted by the null hypothesis (i.e., that the value of the exponent is 1.0).
We first addressed the question of whether separate. parameters are necessary for different amounts of delayed reward. That is, does an equation that has only a single amount-independent A parameter accurately describe the data, or is a model with two A parameters necessary because the smaller amount is discounted more steeply? Consis.-tent with the latter view, the median of the individuals' discount parameten for the smaller ($1,000) amount was .OSS, compared with .010 for the larger ($10,000) amount, but is this difference statistically significant? For 2 subjects (54 and 512), the question of whether there was a difference in the discount parameters for the two delayed reward amounts is moot because at least one of their discount parameten could not be reliably e$-timated (i.e., a hyperbola accounted for less of the variance than the mean). For 8 of the remaining 10 subjects, the discount parameter for the $1,000 reward was larger than that for the $10,000 reward (see Table 1 ), and a Wilcoxon matched-pain signed-ranka test revealed that, as predicted, the A parameter was significantly greater for the smaller amount, T: 10, P < .05.
Given that an adequate model of the present data appean to require separate discount parameters for $1,000 and $10,000 delayed rewards. we next addressed the question of whether it is necessary to raise the denominator to a power, as in Equation 4. That is, if JOEL MYERSON and LEONARD GREEN an exponent is added to an equation with two amount-dependent discount parameten, will the estimate of the exponenl differ significandy from 1.0?
In order to answer this question, Equation 4 was fint reformulated in terms of proportions to facilitale fitting the data for the two delayed amounts with one equation. Recall thal ~ me present value of the delayed reward. is operationally defined as the amount, , of an immediate reward judged to be of 
Because me preceding analysis revealed that the rate of temporal discounting is amount dependent, separate k. parameten for each amount were incorporated into Equation 5 as follows:
where k' is the discount parameter for $10,000 delayed rewards, ~k is the difference between the discount parameteR for $1,000 and $10,000 delayed rewards, and a is a dummy or indicator variable whose value is 0 when the deia)oed reward is $10,000 and 1 when the delayed reward iI $1,000. Thus, when the amount of me de1a)'ed reward is $10,000 (and a -0), Equation 6 is eqWvalenl tõ /~ -1/(1 + k.'D}', and when the delayed reward is $1,000 (and a-I), Equation 6 is equivalent to
Note that for the $1,000 amount, the discount parameter iI equal to the sum of k' and .. A Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test revealed that the median value of the exponent s did not differ significantly from 1.0. Nevertheless, inspection of data from individuaJ mbjecu strongly mggested that some individuals' behavior might be much better described by Equation 6 than by a similar model without an exponenL After all. if me necessary exponent were greater than 1.0 in some cases but less than 1.0 in others. then the median value of the exponent need not differ from 1.0. In order to determine whether an exponent was needed in individual cases, we TEMPORAL DISCOUNTING BY INDIVIDUALS subtraCted the estimate of the .r parameter for each subject from 1.0 and divided the difference by the standard error of the estimate of the exponent for that subjecL The resulting ratio follows the t distribution with (n -P) degrees of freedom. where 11 is the number of data poinu and p is the number of parameters in the model. and thus a simple t teat can be wed to determine whether the exponent for an individual subject differs from 1.0 (GaUant, 1987) . For 8 of the 12 subjecu. .r was significantly different from 1.0, and the median of the individual es increased to .978; for 7 of these 8aubjecu, twas significantly leu than 1.0 (see Table 2 ). Although the improYement in the median lP was small. the addition of the s parameter allowed the model to fit the data from 1 subject (54) whose data were not described by simple hyperbolas, and improved the proportion of explained variance by more than .20 for S other subjecu (SS, 58, and S12). Moreover, the number of subjecu for whom the discount parameter for $1,000 was greater than that for $10,000 increased from 8 to 10 when their data were described by Equation 6 rather than Equation 2 (cf. Tables  1 and 2) .
Ha'ving concluded that a hyperbolic-like model of individual decisions about delayed rewards may require a separate discount parameter for each amount and at least one exponent, our final quesuon concerned whether, as was the case with the discount 271 parameters, amount-specific exponenu are necessary. That is, if tWO exponent parameters are estimated, one for each delayed reward, will they differ significantly? To address this question, Equation 6 was modified to AtIA.. -1/[1 + (k' + 6b.A)D]t+Ms. (7) Again, a is a dummy variable whole value is either 0 or 1 depending on whether the amount of the delayed reward is $10,000 or $1,000. Thus, when the delayed reward is Simple t tests based on the ratio of 6.s to its standard error (Gallant, 1987) were used to evaluate whether, for individual subjects, e. timates of 6.s differed significantly from the null hypothesis (i.e., 6.s -0). The estimated value of 6.s differed significantly from zero in only tWO of the 12 cases. Moreover, the median proportion of explained variance increased by lea than .001. Thus, amount-ipecific exponent parameters added little or nothing to a description of temporal discounting by individual subjects, and an equation such as Equation 6 with a discount parameter for each delayed amount but only a Single exponent appeaR to be the most appropriate model Fits of the three--parameter model (Equation 6) to the data from each individual subject are represen ted by the curves in Figures 2 and 5. For each subject, the values of 1 and s and the proportions of variance explained by the three-parameter model are presented in Table 2 . The three-parameter model also accurately described the group data for both delayed rewards fit simu1taneously (e 3 .984), as shown in Figure 4 . The estimate of the exponent parameter was 0.58g, consistent with the fact that most subjects had exponents less than 1.0. The discount parameten of the equation that best described the group data shown in Figure 4 were 0.111 and 0.045 for the $1,000 and $10,000 rewards. respectively, consistent with amount-dependent discounting. 
DISCUSSION
At the group level, orderly temporal diJo counting of deia}oed rewarda was observed, and the smaller delayed amount was diJo counted more steeply. Hyperbolas provided much better fits to the group data than did the exponential decay functions. This same pattern was also observed at the individual level. That is, all subjects showed orderly di. coun ting that in moat cases was better described by hyperbolas than exponentials (aJthough in some subjects, the present value of delayed rewards tended to level off without reaching zero, a characteristic not captured by eithet a simple hyperbola or an exponential model). Most subjects discounted the $1,000 reward more steeply than the $10,000 rewar.d, resulting in a larger discount parameter (k) for the smaller reward.
These findings replicate previous reports based on analyses of aggregate data (e.g., Rachlin et al.. 1991; ~neri &: Rachlin, 1995) and demonsuate that the same relations observed at the group level may also be ob-JOEL MYERSON -LEONARD GREEN served in the behavior of individuals, Comparisons of models with different numbers of free parameters highlighted the need for amount-dependent discount parameters and, in addition, suggested that raising the denominator of a hyperbo1a-like model to a power often significantly improves its fit to individual data. More specificall}', the exponent parameter (s) is typically less than 1,0, and haa the effect of causing the theoretical curve to decline much more slowly at long delays, corresponding to the leveling off in present value observed in many subjects. Unlike the discount parameter, the exponent parameter was not amount dependent That is, one exponent generally sufficed to describe discounting of both $1,000 and $10,000, although its value varied considerably between individuals. This suggests that the exponent may be viewed as an individualdifference variable, and may reflect lomething about the sensitivities of different individuals to variations in the magnitudes of delays and amounts, Logue, Rodriguez, PeilaCorreal, and Mauro (19M) have made a similar suggestion with respect to exponents in the generalized matching law (Baum, 1974) , A precise quantitative description of be hay. ior is obviously of considerable value even in the absence of a theoretical account of why the description takes a particular fonn. However, the present findings invite consideration of possible mechanisms that may underlie the fonn of the temporal discounting function, Although our findings involve choices between hypothetical monetary rewards, results consistent with hyperbola-like discounting functions have been obtained at the group level wing real rewards with human and nonhuman subjects (Mazur, 1987; Rodriguez Be Logue, 1988) , However, discounting functions of individual subjects have not previoU5-ly been examined systematically wing either real or hypothetical rewards, Future research is needed to determine the generality of the present results, Nevenheless, it does not appear to be premature to speculate on their possible theoretical implications,
The standard economic view of temporal discounting, consistent with the discounted utility model of Samuelson (19!7) , is that di.. counting compensates for the risks associated with waiting for a delayed reward, Given the assumption that there is a constant hazard~ rate. an exponential decreaJe in \'aluc over lime follows direcL~'. "n1is dcorivation i~ theoretical in the normative sensc: il assume5 lhal a decision-making mod~1 should pr~scriõ ptim~ choic~ beha\;or. In contnSt LO the th~orelical underpinnings for the expon~ntial disco\lnting nmction favored by economists, psychologists hav~ favored a hyperbolic disco\lnting function becaUSe' of its ability to describe bchavior. but hav~ b~~n less concerned with a pouible underlying m~chanism. Rachlin and Green (1972) and Ainslie (1975) suggesled that a reciprocal relation betW~~n value and delay (i.e., V -AI D) could account for preference r~rsa1s. thereby l.ak.ing th~ empirical approach characteristic of most subsequent psychological research on discounting. That ii, one begins by discov~ring lawful empirical relations; then, one seeks a fonn of equadon that accurately describes these relations. The reciprocal relation betWeen value and delay has an obviow problem. ho~er. in that il is undefined for immediate rewards. Mazur (1987) present~d a related equation (Equation 2), a hyperbola (of which the reciprocal is a special case), that avoids this problem while preserving the ability to predict preference reYenals. Rachlin and Raineri (1992) pointed out that the hyperbolic reladons and consequent reversals arc commonly found in natUre and therefore suggested that the applicadon of the hyperbola to temporal discounting may not require any special explanation. ' Mazur (1987) showed that a hyperbolic relation betWeen value and delay predicts a linear indifference funcdon, that is. a linear relation betWeen the delay to a larger reward and the delay to a smaller reward when both are judged to be equal in value. Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) revened this logic and showed that given a linear indifference function. the relarion betWeen value and delay 2 II is inleresung 10 note thaI Rachlin takes a posidon with regard to temporal discounting similar to thai attributed to buc Newton with regard to rnYi tation , in that both lee tht precise mathemadcal descripdon of empirical relations U In end in itSelf, F~man (1967) writes that "Newton wu original"" asked aboul his thear}' [oc gTavitation]-'Bul il doesn'l mean an}'thing-il doesn't tell us an)-thing, , to which Newton replitd, 'II tells you hOtI. il moves. ThaI should be enough. I haw told ~u how il mOYes, nol why' ,. (p. 571.
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UNTlNG BY INDIVIDUALS TEMPOR.~L D1SCO mllst be a hyperbola-lik~ function similar in form to Equation 6. of which th~ hyperbola is a ~"pecial case. Howev~r. neither Mazur nor l.n~wenstein and Prel~c deal with the que&-tion of mechanism. that is. the}' do not speculal~ on th~ natur~ of tht' process undr.rlying changes in valu~ as a nlnction of delay. In both cases. it is the data that drive mt' dtri-\'ation. and no rationalization of the fundamental equations or their paramet~rs is offered. Although such resU"aint during the initial exploration or phenon1ena is appropriate and even laudable. at some point phenomena become sufficiently well established that some ~culation as to underlying mechanisms may be in order. w~ believ~ mat ths tudy of choice betWeen delayed rewards may have reached such a point and present ~o possible explanations for the hyperbolic-likc form of th~ temporal discounting function. Onc nlechanism is suggested by the notion that subjects respond as if the')' will havt' rp~a ted choice opponunities with some timĩ nter\-a1 betWeen receipt of a reward and the next choice opponunity (Rachlin. Logue. Gibbon. Ic Frankel. 1986). Assume further that value is proportional to rate (Rachlin, 1971) . That is. let the value. ~ of a r~ be directly proportional to the ratio of the amount. A, to the interreward interval. Let .. represent the amount of time that elapses bt Ween receipt of a reward and the next choice opponunity, so that tht total interreward inter\lal equals ". + D. These assumptions may be formalized in the equation
where b is the proportionality constant that converts rate into units of value. When subjects choose the amount of an immediate re--ward (At) whose vallle (~) is equal to the value (Vd) of a delayed amount (Aa). that is. This is equivalenllo Equation 6 with . = 1/ m and s = q/r. and provides a theoretical explanation for lhe single amount-independent exponenL That is, s reflects individual differences in scaling amount and time. Thus, if the preceding derivation is correct. the exponent s might bC' expected to remain constanl when thC' same individual confronts different choice sitUations.
Alternatively. instead of following psychologists and basing an interpretation of temporal discounting on rate of reward, as in the preceding repeated choice model, one can follow the lead of economists and assume that the discounting of delayed rewards reflects the risk involved in waiting for their receipt. which leads to the following expected value model. In order to derive a hyperbolic relation for the present value of a delayed reward. onC' simply assumes that as time passes. the number of onssiblC' alternative outcomes JOEL MYERSON 4n4 LEONARD GREEN increas~s at a constant rate, k. ThU5, the probabilit\' that on~ will rcceivc.' an imme-diate reward'equals 1.0, whereas the probabilit." that on~ will receive a dela}'ed fe\\'ard is given by p -1/(1 + kD), Th~ assumption that the likelihood of an alternative outcomc increases with time seems to have no lcss face' validin' than the economists' as.~umption that the likelihood of an altemativf: outcome is constant.
If the amount of an immediate' reward that is jltdged to be equal in value to a delayed reward dcpcnds on the expected value of thl atter (EV z pA, where p is the probability of receiving amount A), then At -[1/(1 + kD)]~,
which is equivalent to Equation 2. Nonlinear scaling of amount and probability may be incorporated easily into this model, When subjects judge an immediate, and thcrcfor~ certain, reward to be equal in value to a delayed reward, 
(It may be noted that whereas amount is scaled by raising it to a power, 1; and then multiplying by a constant, c, probability is simply raised to a power, u; otherwise, the scaled probability of a certain outcome would not equa11.0.) Simplifying, one may obtain Atr -[1/(1 + kD)]8~r, and taking the 7th root of both sides yields At -~(1 + kD)8/r. This is equivalent to Equation 6 with s = ul 1; providing an alternative theoretical explanation for the single amount-independent exponent. In this case, s reflects individual differences in scaling amount and probability, and again would be expected to remain constant across choice situations. The contribution of these derivations may be that they provide a theoretical interpretation for each parameter. Such interpretations are testable. For example, consider a third derivation of Equation 2, one based on the assumption that no reward is immediate. That is, if there is some minimum time that elapses betWeen the act of choosing an immediate reward and the consumption of that reward, then incorporating this minimum time leads to a derivaaon of Eouation 2 iso-
